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ABSTRACT 
 
After the exclusive economic zone was established in the late 1970s, the European Union and 
Norway divided the catch quotas from the stocks in the North Sea according to the zonal 
attachment of the stocks. For most of the stocks affected these agreements have held up well, 
but for North Sea herring the agreement was disputed, because as the herring stock grew 
bigger it began to migrate more extensively. 
 
The Norwegian spring spawning herring is also a stock whose migrations appear related to the 
size of the stock. After the stock crashed around 1970 it changed its migratory pattern and 
became confined to the Norwegian exclusive economic zone. As the stock recovered, it 
started to migrate into international waters and the economic zone of other countries. It would 
thus appear that Norway could keep the stock for itself if she fishes down the stock to a level 
low enough to prevent it from migrating out of the Norwegian zone. 
 
This paper analyzes the strategic options of Norway and other countries for which the stock 
may be accessible. It is found that Norway would not necessarily be interested in totally 
preventing the migrations of the herring, even if other interested parties do not cooperate on 
managing the stock. When the other parties do not cooperate they would not leave behind 
anything of the stock that migrates out of the Norwegian zone, but would still be able to free 
ride on the conservation efforts of Norway as a dominant player. The other players in fact 
come out best if they only have access to a small part of the stock, because the incentive for 
Norway to conserve the stock will then be stronger than otherwise. 
 
A cooperative solution would make all parties better off. In a cooperative solution Norway 
must obtain a relatively large share of the total catch quota, because of her strategic 
advantage. The critical share to be offered to Norway does not have anything to do with the 
zonal attachment of the stock, interpreted as the share of the stock within the Norwegian 
economic zone. 
 
There are indications that the changes in the migration of the herring in the late 1960s were 
related to lower temperatures in the ocean north and east of Iceland where the stock foraged 
and wintered in the 1950s and 60s. A rise in the temperature in this area could mean a larger 
carrying capacity for the stock and more extensive migration. This in turn would mean a less 
strong attachment of the stock to the Norwegian economic zone, strengthening the bargaining 
position of other parties than Norway. It is shown that more extensive herring migrations 
could undermine an agreed division of the total quota for herring by making a non-
cooperative solution more attractive for other parties than Norway. This would make a 
renegotiation of the agreement necessary, but this might not take place until after the other 
parties have broken out of the agreement and fished the stock competitively for some time, 
which would imply a major reduction in the stock and the sustainable yield. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the 1970s most coastal states established a 200-mile exclusive economic zone in their 
offshore waters, after the concept had been sanctioned by the then ongoing Law of the Sea 
Conference. In cases where the continental shelf does not extend further than 200 miles from 
shore, the fish stocks confined to the waters of the continental shelf (e.g., cod, plaice) became 
enclosed by the exclusive economic zone. Such stocks do, however, often migrate 
extensively, so that in cases where two or more countries share the same continental shelf, 
these stocks became the shared property of the countries between whose zones they migrate. 
Stocks that inhabit surface waters (e.g., mackerel, herring, tuna) usually migrate much more 
widely than bottom-dwelling fish and often transgress into the high seas outside the 200 mile 
zone of any country. In cases where the continental shelf protrudes out of the exclusive 
economic zone (e.g., the Grand Banks, the Barents Sea, the Bering Sea), even bottom 
dwelling fish straddle out of the exclusive economic zone. 
 
A successful management of transboundary stocks requires that the countries having an 
interest in them agree on how they are to be shared and managed. In the late 1970s Norway 
and the European Union agreed to share the stocks that migrate between their zones according 
to the “zonal attachment” of each stock.1 Zonal attachment can be defined and measured in 
various ways, and precisely how this is done can be controversial. Some fish may be spawned 
in the economic zone of Country A while not becoming fishable until they have moved into 
the zone of Country B, so whose fish is it really? Other types of fish may feed and be fattened 
in the zone of Country C but fishable mainly in the zone of Country D. In the agreements 
between the European Union and Norway zonal attachment was based on the presence of the 
fishable part of the stocks in each party’s zone in the years 1974-78 (Engesæter [1993], p. 94). 
In other contexts different approaches have been applied. One such uses biomass multiplied 
by the time migrating stocks spend in each country’s zone (Hamre [1993]). This was applied 
in the sharing of the capelin stock that migrates between the zones of Greenland, Iceland, and 
Jan Mayen, an island under Norwegian sovereignty (Engesæter [1993]). Instead of biomass 
this approach could be based on the growth of the stock (Hamre [1993]). 
 
For most stocks in the North Sea2 the agreement between Norway and the EU seems to have 
held up well, even if the zonal attachment principle is not necessarily compatible with the 
incentives of the individual countries (Hannesson, 2004). There have been problems, 
however, over North Sea herring. This stock fluctuates considerably in size because of 
environmental factors, and it changes its migratory behavior as it becomes more abundant. 
When the stock recovered in the 1980s from the breakdown in the 1970s it started to migrate 
further north and to a greater extent into the Norwegian exclusive economic zone. This made 
Norway unhappy with the 4 percent share she was being offered on the basis of the previous 
zonal attachment of the stock. For some time no agreement was in force between Norway and 
the European Union, and Norway fished the stock at will within its own zone after the herring 
moratorium was lifted in 1984. In 1986 a new agreement was concluded giving Norway a 
share of 25, 29 or 32 percent, depending on the size of the spawning stock (Engesæter [1993], 
p. 96). 
 
As the North Sea herring example indicates, it is difficult to agree on sharing fish stocks 
whose migratory behavior and accessibility within individual countries’ economic zones 
changes with their size. If a stock is confined to a particular country’s economic zone when it 
                                                 
1
 On the concept of zonal attachment, see see ICES (1978) and Engesæter (1993). 
2
 These stocks are cod, haddock, saithe, plaice, whiting, sprat and herring (Engesæter [1993]). 
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is sufficiently small, that country could easily have incentives to keep the stock down in order 
to prevent it from becoming accessible for others, at any rate if the other interested parties 
turn out to be recalcitrant in agreeing to a cooperative management plan. In any case it seems 
likely that the “core host” country would have a clear advantage when it comes to sharing the 
stock, as its threat point would be determined by what it would obtain if it had the stock all for 
itself. 
 
The Norwegian spring spawning herring appears to be a stock of this kind. This stock spawns 
off the coast of Norway. The juveniles feed in the Norwegian economic zone, and the Russian 
zone if the stock is large enough. The mature stock migrates into the so-called Ocean Loop, 
an area not covered by the exclusive economic zone of any country, and into the Faeroese and 
the Icelandic zones (see Figure 1). These migrations appear to be related to how large the 
stock is. In this paper we analyze the strategic advantage Norway might have from being in a 
position to reserve the stock for itself by keeping it below the level where it starts to migrate 
out of the Norwegian zone. This does not necessarily mean that Norway would have an 
advantage in not sharing the stock with others, but it is likely to have a bearing on how the 
catches from the stock should be shared and what interpretations should be given to the zonal 
attachment principle, or whether that principle is of any interest for how the stock should be 
shared. Lastly we consider how an improvement in ocean climate, such as might result from 
global warming, could affect the Norwegian strategic position and the sharing of the stock. 
An increase in ocean temperature east and north of Iceland would most likely increase the 
migrations of the stock by increasing the supply of plankton in this area where the herring 
stock is now rarely found but where it was abundant in the middle of the last century. 
 
 
THE NORWEGIAN SPRING SPAWNING HERRING 
 
The story of the Norwegian spring spawning herring over the last fifty years or so is dramatic. 
In 1950 this stock may have been almost 20 million tonnes. Figure 2 shows the estimated 
abundance and the catches from this stock. In the 1950s and 60s the catches exceeded one 
million tonnes in most years. This was probably a lot more than the stock could endure, and in 
the late 1960s it crashed, reaching a minimum of less than half a million tonnes in 1972. 
 
The migrations of the Norwegian spring spawning herring are complex but undoubtedly 
influenced by conditions in the ocean and, apparently, the size of the stock as well. Until the 
early 1960s the stock fed off the north coast of Iceland in summer (May to September), 
wintered east of Iceland (November and December), and migrated to the west coast of 
Norway to spawn in February and March.3 The young, immature year classes foraged in 
Norwegian coastal waters and in the Barents Sea. The summer feeding takes place in 
relatively warm, “Atlantic” water, which in summer is rich with plankton (calanus 
finnmarchicus). The cooling of the East Iceland current in the mid-1960s pushed the limit 
between Arctic and Atlantic waters further east (Malmberg, 1969; Malmberg and Jónsson, 
2002), and the feeding migrations in spring and summer were diverted north towards 
Spitzbergen. After the crash around 1970 the stock ceased to migrate out of the Norwegian 
economic zone, wintering in Lofoten, but for the most part spawning further south off the 
                                                 
3
 According to Report of the Scientific Working Group on Zonal Attachment of Norwegian Spring Spawning 
Herring, November 1995. The report was produced by a group of marine biologists from Norway, Iceland, the 
Faeroe Islands and Russia. It has not been formally published but is obtainable in draft form from the marine 
research institutes involved in the said countries. See also Vilhjálmsson (1997). 
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coast of Møre (see Figure 1). It is tempting to explain the less extensive migrations of the 
herring stock after 1970 by a lesser need for food by a small stock. 
 
After the collapse further catches from the stock were banned, except that Norway permitted a 
small catch (7 - 20 thousand tonnes per year). In 1985 the stock showed signs of recovery, and 
boats from Russia began to catch fish from this stock. As the stock recovered further, after a 
short hiatus, the catches from other nations than Norway increased. From 1994 onwards boats 
from Iceland and the Faeroe Islands caught fish from this stock, and a year later boats from 
member countries of the European Union began to do so as well. 
 
The fishing activity of nations other than Norway was due to the fact that as the stock grew 
bigger it began to migrate out of the Norwegian economic zone. This “spillover” first 
occurred into the Soviet zone in the Barents Sea, but as the stock increased further it started to 
migrate into the high seas and into the Faeroese and the Icelandic zones. The Faeroese and the 
Icelandic fisheries occurred partly in the zones of these two countries but also outside the 
exclusive economic zones, in the so-called “Ocean Loop” (see Figure 1). The fishing by the 
EU countries took place in the latter area, since this particular stock hardly ever migrates into 
the EU-zone. Figure 3 shows the spring migrations of the herring stock in recent years. 
 
Increasing fishing by nations other than Norway led to efforts to control the fishery through 
international agreements. In 1999 an agreement was reached among all interested parties on 
the total quota to be allowed and its distribution. In 2003 this agreement fell apart, however, 
due to disputes among the countries involved about the division of the total catch quota. 
 
Since the stock migrates further and wider the larger it is, the Norwegian share of the total 
catch depends on the size of the stock. The Norwegian share of the total catch taken from the 
stock is shown in Figure 4 together with the stock size. The share fell to about 85 percent in 
the late 1980s as the stock came to exceed 2 million tonnes. After that it stayed relatively 
constant despite a continued stock growth until it fell rather precipitously to about 60 percent 
in 1995. Since that time the stock has stayed relatively constant at about 8 million tonnes, and 
so has the Norwegian share of the catch. It would seem, therefore, that Norway has a 
dominant strategic position in the game about the herring. She could elect to fish down the 
stock to a level which would prevent it from migrating outside the Norwegian exclusive 
economic zone. While this is not necessarily the best strategy for Norway to follow it is likely 
to be important for how the spoils of the cooperative play would be divided. 
 
 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON THE HERRING GAME 
 
Two recent papers discuss the exploitation of the Norwegian spring spawning herring from a 
game theoretic perspective (Arnason, Magnusson and Agnarsson [2000], and Lindroos and 
Kaitala [2000]). Both papers focus on the forming of coalitions among the exploiting nations 
and on the scope for attaining a globally cooperative solution. These papers take different 
approaches. Lindroos and Kaitala identify three players, Norway/Russia, in whose zones the 
stock spawns and grows up; Iceland/Faeroe Islands, into whose zones the stock migrates; and 
the EU countries, which can fish the stock in the international area outside 200 miles. They 
use a year class model and assume that the unit fishing costs are inversely related to the 
exploited stock, an assumption that is probably unrealistic for the herring stock. They find that 
a fully cooperative solution is unlikely except if the fishery is rather inefficient (low 
catchability coefficient). Arnason, Magnusson and Agnarsson use a general biomass model 
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and consider explicitly the migrations of the stock between the economic zones of different 
countries, as well as its migration into the international area outside 200 miles. They assume 
that the cost of catching herring is unrelated to the size of the stock but related to the distance 
of the fishing locations from the home port of the boats. They identify five players, Norway, 
Russia, Iceland, the Faeroe Islands, and the EU. The find that a globally cooperative solution 
would require side payments to Norway and that many of the potential coalitions in the game 
would not be viable. 
 
Neither one of these papers considers the possibility that the stock would be confined to the 
Norwegian economic zone provided it is small enough, making it possible for Norway to act 
as a sole owner and, in its own interest, conserve the stock just below this critical level. This 
would seem sufficient to prevent the nearly total depletion of the stock that occurs in some 
scenarios in Lindroos and Kaitala’s model. The model of Arnason, Magnusson and Agnarsson 
gives an advantage to Norway, due to letting the stock originate in the Norwegian zone. This 
results in the need for side payments to Norway in order to make her interested in a 
cooperative solution. These side payments could take the form of Norway being allowed to 
fish in the economic zone of other countries (in the spatial model used by these authors no 
country is permitted to fish in the economic zone of another country unless explicitly 
permitted to do so). In the context of this present paper, this would amount to giving Norway 
a larger share of the herring stock than its zonal attachment would dictate. 
 
This paper applies a general biomass model of the same type as Arnason, Magnusson and 
Agnarsson and focuses on the consequences of the migratory behavior of the herring stock 
being dependent on its size. While the model in this paper is applied to one particular stock it 
would seem that the whole approach is suggestive of what might happen in other cases where 
one particular country has an advantage similar to what Norway seems to have in this case. 
 
 
THE MODEL 
 
The herring fishery is modeled in discrete time, where fishing occurs at the beginning of each 
period, with growth taking place after the fishery is over and depending on the size of the 
stock left after fishing. Formally 
 
( )1t t tX G S S+ = +  
 
t t tS X Y= −  
 
where X is the stock at the beginning of a period, Y is the catch of fish during the period, and 
G(.) is the surplus growth of the stock (natural growth less decay). This general biomass 
model is used for simplicity; in reality the herring stock consists of several year classes of 
fish, and the surplus growth of the stock consists of the growth of all the different year classes 
in the stock in any given time period. In an appendix a year class model meant to reflect long 
term (average) conditions is discussed and contrasted with the general biomass model. 
 
The most popular general biomass growth equation is the logistic: 
 
( )1 /G rS S K= −  
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Used in the above equation we get the equation to be estimated: 
 
2
1t t t tX S S Sα β+ − = −  
 
where the parameters of the logistic equation are r = α and K = α /β. 
 
A variant of the logistic equation is the asymmetric logistic 
 
( )1 /G rS S K γ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦  
 
The Ricker equation, even if developed for a recruitment relationship, may also be used as a 
general biomass growth function: 
 
( )1 exp (1 / )t t tX S a S K+ = −  
 
which can be estimated on logarithmic form as 
 
( ) ( )1ln lnt t tX S Sα β+ − = −  
 
where the parameters are a = α and K = α/β. 
 
Data on the stock size (X) and the catches (Y) of the Norwegian spring spawning herring since 
1950 are published in ICES (2003), Table 3.3.3. From this we can calculate the stock left 
behind after fishing (S) as 
 
St = Xt - Yt. 
 
Table 1 
 
Estimation of a surplus growth function for Norwegian spring spawning herring. 
 
 Logistic Ricker 
 α β K R2 α β K R2 
1950-2002 0.14407 
(2.64) 
-0.00725 
(-1.74) 
19.9 0.012 0.13912 
(2.61) 
-0.00793 
(-1.09) 
17.5 0.020 
1950-1972 0.06020 
(0.76) 
-0.00181 
(-0.33) 
33.2 0.037 -0.03806 
(-0.84) 
0.00577 
(1.28) 
6.59 0.075 
1972-2002 0.36310 
(1.71) 
-0.03653 
(-1.14) 
9.94 0.040 0.23553 
(2.61) 
-0.02158 
(-1.09) 
10.9 0.040 
 
 
Table 1 shows the results of estimating the logistic equation and the Ricker equation (t-values 
are in parentheses), as well as the implied values of K. Results are shown for the entire period 
and for two sub-periods. The dividing line between the two sub-periods is the early 1970s 
when the stock had collapsed and radically changed its migratory behavior. It can therefore be 
argued that the growth parameters of the stock most likely changed as well after the early 
1970s. We may note that the carrying capacity implied by both equations is rather similar for 
the entire period and for the period 1972-2002. The carrying capacity for the latter period is 
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close to 10 million tonnes, which is similar to what Arnason, Magnusson and Agnarsson 
(2000) found by a similar approach. The results for the entire period after 1950 indicate about 
twice as large carrying capacity, which could be due to the much wider migration of the stock 
in the 1950s and 60s. This is supported by the logistic equation for the period 1950-72, which 
shows a much larger carrying capacity for that period, about 30 million tonnes. The results 
obtained for the Ricker equation for that sub-period are, however, nonsensical, implying a 
negative value of the parameter a. In the 1950s the stock was between ten and twenty million 
tonnes (Figure 2). 
 
It is evident from the low values of the R2s in Table 1 that neither of the two equations can 
explain much of the annual growth in the stock. The growth of the herring stock is much 
affected by variability of recruitment (i.e., size of new cohorts of fish being added to the 
stock). This variability is due to environmental factors which are poorly understood and 
which no model of stock-dependent growth can be expected to explain. That notwithstanding, 
a stock-growth model could make some sense for describing what happens under average 
conditions. Figure 5 shows the calculated annual growth (Gt = Xt+1 - St) of the stock and the 
functions estimated for the period 1972-2002. 
 
Figure 5 also shows an asymmetric logistic growth curve estimated by an optimization routine 
minimizing the sum of squared deviations between the calculated values of G and the values 
implied by the growth function. The skewness parameter is quite large (6.0), implying a 
surplus growth function that is heavily skewed to the right and a substantially higher 
maximum growth than the other two curves, but a lower carrying capacity. The year class 
approach discussed in an appendix indicates, however, that the surplus growth curve could be 
skewed to the left and not to the right. In the following we will use the symmetric logistic 
function with rounded-off parameters of r = 0.36 and K = 10, as the Ricker function seems to 
give a too low maximum sustainable yield and the asymmetric logistic a too great maximum 
sustainable yield and a curve that is skewed in the wrong direction. 
 
The Norwegian share of the stock, or zonal attachment, (u) is assumed to be determined as 
follows: 
 
( )
( )
1if
1 otherwise
S S
v S Su
K S
⎧ ≤⎪
−= ⎨
−⎪
−⎩
 
 
where S is the critical stock level left after fishing at which the stock does not migrate out of 
the Norwegian zone and v is the maximum share others could obtain of the stock. Hence the 
Norwegian share of the catch falls uniformly from 1 as the stock increases from the critical 
level S  to the carrying capacity level K, where u = 1 - v. This is a simplification of the 
stepwise relationship produced by the catches in recent years and shown in Figure 4. 
 
The herring is a schooling fish, for which it may be expected that the unit cost of fish does not 
depend on the stock.4 Under those circumstances the optimal exploitation of the stock is 
independent of prices and costs, except that the price must be high enough to cover the unit 
cost. If the price depends on the catch volume, this must hold at the margin. If the objective is 
                                                 
4
 In a study of the North Sea herring, Bjørndal (1987) reported results that imply a very weak dependence of unit 
costs on the size of the stock. 
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maximization of the present value of the fishery over an infinite time horizon, the general 
condition for optimality is that the marginal rate of surplus growth of the stock should be 
equal to the rate of interest. Here we will for simplicity ignore time discounting and instead 
assume that the goal is to maximize the annual rent from the fishery. 
 
 
THE COMPETITIVE SOLUTION 
 
Let us look, first, at a competitive solution where there is no cooperation between the parties 
and each takes the stock level the other parties leave behind after fishing in their own 
economic zone as given. We simplify the setting to two players, Norway and the others. A 
justification for this is that in the competitive setting it turns out that the competitive players 
have incentives never to leave behind anything of the stock that migrates into their zone. This 
occurs because the stock they leave behind does not stay in their zone but migrates back into 
the Norwegian zone where it winters. This apparently accords with the present behavior of the 
stock. At the beginning of the next period (next spring) the stock migrates and spills over into 
other countries’ zones and into the international area outside 200 miles according to the share 
parameters u and v explained above. 
 
Maximizing the rent per year in a steady-state equilibrium entails, for Norway (N) and the 
others (O), respectively, maximizing each party’s share of the sustainable yield: 
 
( )( ) Nu S G S S S+ −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
 
( ) ( )1 ( ) Ou S G S S S− + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
 
where S = SN  + SO. The first order conditions are 
 
( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) 1 0u S G S u S G S S′ ′+ + + − =⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 0u S G S u S G S S′ ′− + − + − =⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
 
Obviously these cannot be satisfied simultaneously except if the stock is shared evenly among 
the two parties (u = 0.5). We conclude that while Norway will leave behind some of the stock 
in her zone, the others will take everything that straddles into their zone or into the high seas. 
They will still be able to benefit from what Norway leaves behind, because some of the stock 
that emerges at the beginning of each period will migrate out of the Norwegian zone, 
provided that the stock Norway leaves behind after fishing is large enough. In the non-
cooperative setting, the others do not get a high enough return from any fish they might 
choose to leave behind. 
 
Figure 6 shows how the optimal stock for Norway to leave behind changes as the maximum 
share of the others (v) increases. For a high enough maximum share for the others (v > 0.6), 
Norway keeps the stock down at the level below which it does not spill over into the others’ 
zones or into the high seas ( 2)S = . As v falls below 0.6, Norway leaves more fish behind, 
and some of the stock migrates out of the Norwegian zone. If the stock would always stay in 
the Norwegian zone no matter how large it is Norway would operate as a sole owner and 
leave behind half of the virgin stock. 
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Before examining the cooperative solution, let us look briefly at how the non-cooperative 
solution changes as a result of varying other parameters. Figure 7 shows how the optimal 
stock to be left behind by Norway varies with the level at which the stock starts to migrate out 
of the Norwegian zone. If this critical level is 3 or more the optimal Norwegian strategy is to 
keep the stock at this critical level and prevent it from migrating out of the Norwegian zone. If 
the critical level is 2 or less it is optimal for Norway to leave behind slightly more than this 
(the critical level appears close to 2, judging Figure 4). Hence, if the most likely critical level 
is 2 and the maximum share others could ever take is about 40 percent, which seems to 
correspond to the present circumstances, then the optimal non-cooperative strategy for 
Norway would be to keep the stock slightly above this critical level and allow limited 
migration of the stock out of her own zone. 
 
Now consider the sustainable catches in the non-cooperative solution. Figure 8 shows how the 
catches of Norway and the others depend on the maximum share (v) the others would ever 
have of the stock, given that 2S = . What is particularly interesting to note is that the catches 
taken by the others will be greatest if their maximum possible share of the stock is low 
(between 10 and 20 percent). This is so because if they have a low share, the dominant player 
(Norway) will have a strong incentive to leave a large stock behind after fishing, because she 
will reap most of the benefits of this herself. On this the others are able to ride for free. As the 
maximum stock the others will ever have increases their catches in fact go down, because 
Norway then has an incentive to fish down the stock in order to reduce its migrations out of 
the Norwegian zone, and if the maximum share of the others is 70 percent or more the best 
strategy for Norway is to fish the stock so heavily that it never migrates out of her zone. 
 
 
THE COOPERATIVE SOLUTION 
 
In a cooperative solution the parties would maximize the sustainable yield, which in this case 
is 0.9. Agreement would have to be reached on how the gains from this were to be shared. 
One possible solution is the Nash bargaining solution by which the parties first maximize the 
gain to be obtained and then share it evenly. The opportunity cost of the cooperative solution 
is the catch obtained in the non-cooperative play, which clearly is much higher for Norway 
than for the others. Sharing the gains evenly thus implies 
 
( ) ( ), ,0.9 (1 ) 0.9N N N OY Yα α− = − −  
 
where α is the share of the catch going to Norway and YN,N and YN,O are the catches of Norway 
and the others in the non-cooperative solution. Furthermore, one could ask what the share 
going to Norway would have to be at the minimum to make her interested in concluding an 
agreement about cooperation. Clearly her share of the cooperative catch would have to give 
her at least as great a catch as she would get in the non-cooperative solution. This defines the 
minimum Norwegian share 
 
,
min / 0.9N NYα =  
 
How these two shares depend on the others’ maximum share of the resource stock is 
illustrated in Figure 9. Norway would have to get at least 60 percent of the sustainable yield, 
and an even split of the gains would give her a share of about 80 percent, but both shares 
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approach one as the stock becomes more confined to the Norwegian zone. It is worthwhile to 
note that these shares bear no direct relation to the so-called zonal attachment of the stock, 
i.e., how much of the stock is to be found inside the two players’ economic zones. In the 
cooperative solution (S = 5) the share of the stock in the Norwegian zone (the line u coop) 
would increase linearly from 70 percent when v = 0.8 to 100 percent when v = 0, while 97 
percent or more of the stock would be in the Norwegian zone in the non-cooperative solution. 
 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
One possible effect of a warming of the ocean north and east of Iceland is that the living 
conditions for the herring would improve in the area. In the 1950s and 60s, as well as earlier, 
the herring migrated towards the northern coast of Iceland and gave rise to a substantial 
fishery there. The disappearance of the herring stock from these areas need not have been due 
solely to overfishing but could also be due to a cooling off of the ocean in this area. In the 
1960s the temperature and salinity in these waters dropped precipitously, and at the same time 
the herring stopped migrating so far west (Malmberg, [1969]. Shortly after the dip both 
temperature and salinity recovered, although apparently not quite to the previous level (see 
Malmberg and Jónsson [2002], Figure 2). Nevertheless the herring has not resumed its 
previous migrations, but it is not unlikely that a further rise in temperature would bring this 
about. 
 
Three different, but not mutually exclusive, consequences for the herring stock may be 
envisaged to result from a rising ocean temperature north and east of Iceland. First, the 
migrations of the Norwegian spring spawning herring could extend further west and make the 
stock more accessible for exploitation by non-Norwegian fishermen. Secondly, growth 
conditions could improve so that the maximum stock size would increase. This, in turn, could 
generate more extensive migrations. Third, local spring spawning herring stocks could 
emerge. Prior to the herring collapse some herring spawned at Iceland and at the Faeroe 
Islands, and there are reports of herring spawning off Greenland in the 1930s, a period with a 
substantially higher temperature in those waters than in later years (Vilhjálmsson, 1997).5 
These local spawning stocks have long since disappeared, but a summer spawning herring 
stock remains at Iceland and in a healthy condition. 
 
Here we will concentrate on the implications for the sharing of the herring by a larger 
carrying capacity of the environment and more extensive migrations, leaving aside the 
possibility that local spawning stocks would emerge. We model this as doubling of K to 20. 
From the earlier discussion it may be recalled that the stock was between ten and twenty 
million tonnes in the 1950s. A K = 20 need not, therefore, be at all unrealistic even if it is far 
beyond what the stock is today. 
 
The effect of this change would be to encourage further migration of herring out of the 
Norwegian zone. Figure 10 shows that it would still be optimal for Norway in a non-
cooperative solution to deplete the stock down to a quite low level, in order to discourage 
migration out of the Norwegian zone, but the stock left behind after fishing would be higher 
in this case than with a less productive ocean; Norway would not deplete the herring stock in 
her zone all the way to the critical level of 2 where it ceases to migrate out of the zone. 
 
                                                 
5
 This complex of stocks used to be called Atlanto-Scandian herring. 
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Another and a more troublesome effect of better conditions in the ocean is that the other 
parties would probably have to be offered a more lucrative deal in order to ensure their 
participation in a cooperative solution. The improved conditions in the sea imply that these 
parties get a larger share of the benefit from the stock left behind by Norway, but they still 
have no incentives to leave behind any of the stock in their own zone. Figure 11 shows the 
critical share of the maximum sustainable yield that the other parties would have to get in 
order to play cooperatively (this share is calculated in a way analogous to min α above). As 
the figure shows, this critical share rises substantially as K increases from 10 to 20. The figure 
also shows the other parties’ share (1 - α) of the cooperative sustainable catch prior to 
improved conditions in the ocean (i.e., with K = 10) when the gains from cooperation are 
evenly divided. For some values of v the critical share under the new conditions exceeds the 
Nash bargaining share in the cooperative solution under the old conditions, implying that the 
other parties would gain from reverting to the non-cooperative play unless the share they get 
in the cooperative solution were revised. 
 
Improved conditions in the ocean are therefore likely to put agreements on cooperation under 
strain, especially because such secular changes in stock growth may be difficult to distinguish 
from year to year variability, which is substantial and has been ignored here; lasting 
agreements will have to be concluded on the basis of long term average conditions, but will 
come under strain as such conditions change. The consequences of such breakdowns could be 
dramatic. Suppose, for example, that the parties have believed in K = 10 for some time but 
that the others have now concluded that the ocean has become more productive and that they 
should get a bigger share of the stock. After the breakdown, both parties would be likely to 
revert to non-cooperative play; Norway would reduce its escapement to something like 2 - 3 
million tonnes, the others would catch all they can get, and the stock left behind after fishing 
would fall by one half or so, from 5 million tonnes to 2 - 3 million tonnes despite increased 
productivity of the ocean and a greater carrying capacity. 
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APPENDIX: THE SURPLUS GROWTH MODEL VERSUS A MULTI-YEAR CLASS 
APPROACH 
 
As mentioned in the main text, the Norwegian spring spawning herring stock consists of 
several year classes. It is of interest to check the logistic growth function against the surplus 
growth that would emerge from a more realistic multi-year class model. For this purpose we 
look at the yield of an average year class of herring over its life-span. This is the same as the 
annual yield from a stock in a steady state. 
 
The herring stock consists of sixteen or more year classes. For natural mortality, maturity, and 
exploitation pattern we use the parameters in Table 3.4.4 in ICES (2003). A logistic growth 
function was used to express weight at age (wt), where t denotes age and t0 = 3: 
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The parameters of the function were estimated from the weight at age observed for the stock 
in 2002 (Table 3.2.2.2 in ICES [2003]). The estimation was done by an optimization routine 
minimizing the sum of squared deviations between the observed weight at age and the 
calculated weight. The parameters estimated were t0, a and w∞. Figure A1 shows the values 
generated by the weight function and the sampled weight at age. The agreement is not poor, 
but the sampled weight at age follows a somewhat curious pattern, indicating an uneven 
growth over the life span of the fish. This could be due to the age groups having experienced 
different growth conditions over their life time. Therefore, a better result could be expected 
from fitting the growth curve to the weights of individual cohorts. From Table 3.2.2.2 in ICES 
(2003) it is possible to identify 40 cohorts, starting at the age 3. The parameters of the growth 
curve did not come out very differently using these data, as can be seen from Table A1. In the 
following the estimates for the 2002 stock will be used. 
 
 
Table A1 
 
Value of the parameters of the logistic weight at age function estimated from observations in 
2002 and from weights of 40 year classes. 
 
 wt0 a w∞ 
Stock 2002 0.1702 0.2624 0.4468 
40 year classes 0.1837 0.2715 0.4385 
 
 
Figure A2 shows the development of the weight at age of the 40 said year classes, starting 
with the year class of 1947 (three year old herring 1950). These diagrams show that the 
growth of fish can be highly variable; it is not uncommon to see the age-specific weight of a 
year class drop as it grows older. This could be due to sampling error, but undoubtedly growth 
conditions vary from year to year. From about 1970, when the year class of 1961 was nine 
years old, the growth apparently became much more irregular; this was the time at which the 
herring stock collapsed. In the 1970s and 80s the growth of older year classes apparently was 
greater than earlier; the year classes gained more in weight and the maximum weight at age 
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apparently rose. It is tempting to conclude that the growth is density dependent; in this period 
the stock was extremely small (see Figure 2). From around 1980, when the 1967-71 year 
classes were ten years old or more, there was a sudden and sharp reversal in growth; weight 
appears to have declined with age for an extended period. It is less tempting here to invoke 
density dependence, as the stock growth up until the late 1980s was slow. Since about 1990 
the individual growth has been more regular and similar to what it was in the 1950s and 60s, 
and the weight at age has also been lower than in the 1970s and 80s and about the same as in 
the 1950s and 60s. Apparently the stock size and behavior is becoming more like what it was 
in the middle of the previous century, although the migrations are less extensive. 
 
A crucial step in obtaining a surplus growth curve is the link between recruitment of young 
fish and the size of the spawning stock. As already stated, the recruitment of young fish is 
highly variable; it can vary by an order of magnitude for the same spawning stock. The 
reasons for this are not well understood but apparently are related to fluctuations in the marine 
environment. Figure A3 shows the number of recruits plotted against the spawning stock. A 
correlation is not apparent. 
 
Table A2 
 
Estimates of a log-linear recruitment function. Data from Table 3.3.3 in ICES (2003). 
 
 
 
 
A log-linear relationship between the number of recruits and the size of the spawning stock is 
 
1t tR aS
β
+ =  
 
where R is recruitment, and S is the size of the spawning stock. Estimation of the log-linear 
form gave the results in Table A2 (t-values in parenthesis). This implies a linear relationship 
between spawning stock and recruitment, but we need a concave recruitment function to get 
meaningful results. The model starts with a given number of recruits (R). Depending on total 
fish mortality (Z), these recruits produce a certain spawning stock biomass. Call this 
relationship f(Z). This spawning stock biomass must produce the number of recruits we 
started with through the recruitment function R(B). We thus seek the solution of 
 
B - f(Z)R(B) = 0 
 
For a given level of Z, f(.) is a constant, so in order to get a solution R(B) must be non-linear, 
and for a meaningful solution R(B) must be concave in B. A frequently used concave 
recruitment function is the Beverton-Holt function: 
 
1 /
aBR
B b
=
+
 
 
A logarithmic form of this function was estimated with an optimization routine minimizing 
the sum of squared deviations between observed and calculated recruitment. The parameter 
α β R2 
2.3934 
(10.90) 
1.0053 
(6.70) 
0.46 
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values obtained were a = 11.8 and b = 54. These values differ greatly from the values 
obtained by Patterson (a = 32.459 and b = 3.044867), reported in Lindroos and Kaitala (2000, 
p. 326). Figure A3 shows Beverton-Holt recruitment functions with both sets of parameters, 
together with the observed recruitment. The function using Patterson’s estimates is more 
curved and appears easier to reconcile with some facts of the fishery, as discussed below.  
 
The surplus growth as a function of the spawning stock biomass6 using the Beverton-Holt 
recruitment function with both sets of parameters is shown in Figure A4. The two curves are 
remarkably different. The one using the parameters reported above is nearly symmetrical, but 
implies a rather large maximum biomass (over 30 million tonnes) and a low maximum 
sustainable yield (less than 650 thousand tonnes). The natural mortality assumed for the zero 
age group until it reaches the age of three is rather high, or 2.5, while the total mortality of the 
zero age group until it reaches the age of three, according to Table 3.4.4 in ICES (2003), is 
1.8. Using this latter number implies a still greater and less realistic maximum biomass. More 
seriously, the fishing mortality needed to maximize the sustainable yield is extremely small 
(about 0.03), and a fishing mortality of 0.09 would be enough to wipe out the spawning stock. 
This is way below the fishing mortality of recent years, which has been about 0.2 or more. 
 
The sustainable yield curve obtained with Patterson’s estimates is markedly skewed to the 
left. The maximum sustainable yield is markedly higher than in the logistic model while the 
supporting spawning stock and the maximum spawning stock are both lower. The spawning 
stock biomass providing maximum sustainable yield is about eight million tonnes, which is 
close to the actual biomass in recent years. The unexploited biomass (the carrying capacity) is 
almost 25 million tonnes, which is greater than the stock was in 1950. The maximum 
sustainable yield is more than twice as high as with the other set of parameters, or 1.5 million 
tonnes. The fishing mortality needed to produce maximum sustainable yield is 0.25, which is 
not unreasonable although perhaps a little high. The total mortality assumed for the 0-age 
group until it reaches the age of three was as in ICES (2003), Table 3.4.4. 
 
While Patterson’s estimates can be more easily reconciled with the facts of the herring 
fishery, it is possible to find parameter values for the Beverton-Hold recruitment function 
which would do even better in this respect and be more in tune with the logistic model used in 
the main text. Figure A5 shows the sustainable yield curve emerging with a = 32 and b = 2. It 
has maximum for a spawning stock of about 5 million tonnes, like the logistic model, but a 
larger carrying capacity, because the curve is skewed to the left. It produces a maximum 
sustainable yield of about 960 thousand tonnes, which is slightly more than the logistic model. 
The corresponding fishing mortality is slightly above 0.2, which is close the fishing mortality 
in recent years. Hence it is possible to find parameter values that reasonably reconcile the 
logistic model and the multi-year class approach. The fundamental problem is, however, what 
meaning to ascribe to normal, average conditions for a fish stocks influenced by such 
enormous environmental fluctuations as the Norwegian spring spawning herring apparently is. 
The logistic equation is not necessarily much worse in that respect than the apparently more 
realistic multi-year class approach. 
                                                 
6
 It was assumed that the spawning stock has been exposed to 20 percent of the total mortality, as in Table 3.4.4 
in ICES (2003). 
